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NOTES
Judicial Deference to Legislative Reality: The Interpretation of Title IX in
the Context of Collegiate Athletics
Perhaps no two themes have longer remained more central to the
theory of American governance than the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers' and the principle of equality of opportunity.2 Yet the promise of
theory has only incompletely been fulfilled in fact. This Note will treat
both themes in a context where they intersect in undiluted form: col-
legiate athletics. This Note concludes that the concept of representative
democracy, central to American governance,3 can be realized only by
the accordance of great deference to the legislative branch by its coor-
dinate branches4 even when, as in the athletic context, such deference
I. "Although the doctrine is not specifically set forth in the federal constitution . . . the
doctrine has apparently a general origin in Montesquieu's declaration that 'when the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person, or the same body of magistrates, there can be
no liberty, because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyranni-
cal laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.'" C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 3.04, at 31-32 (4th ed. 1972) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIIUT OF THE LAWS 215).
"Under the state and federal constitutions in the United States . . . institutional separation of
power was accepted as a natural and basic organization of government and during the latter half
of the nineteenth century it became an unalterable basis for the separation of functions." C.
SANDS, supra, § 4.03, at 74 (citing Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "Separation of Pow-
ers", 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935)).
Viewed by the modem political theorist, "[s]eparation of the powers of government for exercise
by separate functionaries is a mode of political organization and operation calculated to safeguard
liberty not only by preventing concentration of too much power in the same hands but also by
effecting a measure of equilibrium among correlative power centers according to the classic con-
ception of checks and balances and by defining authority and identifying its residence in order to
facilitate establishing and enforcing responsibility." C. SANDS, supra, § 3.02, at 28.
2. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. "That to secure these rights [life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness] Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .. " The
Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). "[T]he general concern [is] that large decisions
of policy should be grounded in consent. Consent is the product of compromise and can only be
arrived at through representation." Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 359, 359 (1947), reprinted in C. SANDS, supra note 1, at 197.
"It is folly and a contradiction of the teachings of history to believe, whatever the defects of the
legislative institution, that democracy can be preserved without legislative primacy in a people-
elected and a people-responsive delegate legislature." Breital, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 763 (1965), reprinted in C. SANDS, supra note 1, at 164. "[Tjhe legislative process is deliberat-
edly exposed to the buffeting and the pressures of outside interests. This lends a responsiveness to
the needs of the community as expressed by those interested." Breital, supra at 761.
4. "It is the legislative branch, for good and for ill, which holds the key to democratic insti-
1
DeVine: Judicial Deference to Legislative Reality: The Interpretation of
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
602 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
may temporarily retard the goal of equality of opportunity.5 In the
context of Title IX's construction, this principle requires use of the di-
rect funding interpretation to give the words of Title IX's triggering
language their "ordinary meaning."
6
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION AND TITLE IX
Enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' evi-
denced congressional concern over a heritage of sex discrimination in
the educational context. 8 In athletics this imbalance of opportunity has
been particularly salient 9 and has had a harmful effect on the educa-
tutions." Breital, supra note 3, at 772. "The effect [of the decline in prestige of the legislative
branch, leading to a power vacuum filled by both executive and judicial branches] on the political
structure has been drastic, especially if it is recognized that in a modern democratically organized
society, periodically elected lawmaking delegates, separate from the executive, are the distinguish-
ing mark." Id. at 760. "[lIt is not for the judicial branch to arrogate powers that can only in the
long run degrade the legislative branch the more and disjoint the most effectively democratic
organ in government. Institutionally, the modern democracy has in the popularly elected legisla-
ture its unique home and its last resort against subversion or tyranny." Id. at 775. "Since we now
have legislatures specifically designed and equipped to discharge the primary function of making
law, it can be argued that courts ought to leave to legislatures the principal responsibility for legal
change and modernization." C. SANDS, supra note 1, § 3.26, at 59.
5. The interpretation of Title IX's triggering language which this Note advocates may in-
deed lead to the wholesale exemption of collegiate athletic departments from Title IX's strictures.
See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. To this objection, the Note responds that Congress,
and not the courts, is where the social concerns of the citizenry are best aired, weighted, and
resolved into legislative compromise. See Breitel, supra note 3, at 762 ("people-responsive" laws
can best be created in legislatures). In other words, it is not worth artificially invigorating a statute
at the cost of sacrificing the primacy in lawmaking of the very legislative forum where the popular
will is heard regularly, robustly, and efficaciously. Put another way, "[wihat tomorrow will bring
no one knows, but whatever it is, it will be a safer and more stable society if the seats of political
power remain divided whatever the cost." Id. at 776.
6. Absence of adequate evidence of legislative intent requires according to statutory terms
their "ordinary meaning." North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 544 & n.7 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting). See infra note 97.
7. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683
(1982)).
8. See, e.g., Commentary, Sex Discrimination in Athletics.- Conflicting Legislative and Judi-
cialApproaches, 29 ALA. L. REV. 390, 390 (1978) ("Sex discrimination has stifled the potential of
over half the American population."); Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics. HEW Gets Seri-
ous About Equality in Sports?, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 573, 573 (1980) ("Women as a class have
been discriminated against throughout history."). See also infra note 10 (educational and career
detriment to women resulting from sex discrimination in athletics).
9. See Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n,
647 F.2d 651passim (6th Cir. 1981) (historical sketch of discrimination against girls and women in
American sports). See also H. NIXON II, SPORT AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 50 (1976) (women's
sports facilities usually inferior to men's); G. SAGE, SPORT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 285-86 (2d
ed. 1974) (women historically excluded from sports); Edwards, Desegregating Sexist Sport, in OUT
OF THE BLEACHERS: WRITINGS ON WOMEN AND SPORT 188, 191 (S. Twin ed. 1979) ("Sexually,
the most segregated department on any major college campus in the athletics department. It takes
only a glance at its budget and the degree of public and administrative concern over its function-
ing to understand that it is also the most important."); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Athletics,
21 VILL. L. REV. 876, 901 & n.191 (1976) (men's teams have had better funding, equipment,
coaching, and concomitant prestige than have women's teams); Note, supra note 8, at 593 n.96
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tional and career development of women. t0 Title IX's language never-
theless reveals that the enacting congressional majority did not wish to
purge all sex-differentiation from the educational milieu. What begins
as a blanket prohibition of sex discrimination is crippled by its con-
("Traditionally, sports have provided men with a medium for communicating positive role mod-
els. This has not been true for women.")
10. Because athletic participation has beneficial effects on other aspects of the athlete's life,
denial to women of opportunities equal to those enjoyed by men to participate in athletics restricts
women's educational and career development. Cf. A. GUTTMANN, FROM RITUAL TO RECORD:
THE NATURE OF MODERN SPORTS 157 (1978) ("In sport we can discover the euphoric sense of
wholeness, autonomy, and potency which is often denied us in the dreary rounds of routinized
work that are the fate of most men and women."); P. MCINTOSH, FAIR PLAY: ETHICS IN SPORT
AND EDUCATION 156 (1979) ("Players ... are moulded by their games; they do not just play
them."); H. NIXON II, supra note 9, at 43 (recognition resulting from college sports participation
can lead directly to success in non-sports career endeavors); J. SCOTT, THE ATHLETIC REVOLU-
TION 178 (1971) (college athletics are a means of social advancement for a talented few); Edwards,
supra note 9, at 188, 191, 196-97 ("[Slport [is] perhaps the basic institution allowing for communal
reaffirmation of secular values." Id. at 188); Comment, supra note 9, at 876 ("School-sponsored
athletic programs, long considered an integral part of education, have also served to reinforce
sexual stereotypes."); Note, supra note 8, at 593 nn.95 & 96, 594 n.98 (crucial to equalize opportu-
nities in athletics in order to provide women with the positive social self-image which sports par-
ticipation has provided men). See generally Yellow Springs Exempted School Dist. v. Ohio High
School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 passim (6th Cir. 1981) (salubrious and educational benefits of
athletic participation historically denied to girls and women).
It is undeniable that success in college sports may have a direct beneficial effect on one's career
in professional sports. The indirect beneficial effects of intercollegiate athletic success are less
quantifiable, but, as the above-cited sources indicate, are generally acknowledged.
Some see a more direct causal link between athletic prowess and success in non sports-related
pursuits, whether career or social. Uncompromisingly put, this argument holds that "conditions
of American sport constitute a fundamental obstacle to the achievement of women's equality in
American society . . . . [U]ntil [women] have succeeded in overthrowing male domination of
sport, they might as well be running on a treadmill." Edwards, supra note 9, at 188.
Many variables in addition to college athletic success may interact to further the former college
athlete's career and social mobility. H. NIXON 1I, supra note 9, at 45. These additional variables
obscure the causal relationship between athletic participation and success in later life. A list of
such variables would include: university and degree marketability and prestige; academic per-
formance personality traits and innate skills or inteligence which may increase career and social
mobility; family socio-economic stratum; the sport in which the former college athlete achieved
success, (see G. SAGE, supra note 9, at 259); characteristics of the universe of college students as
compared to the pool of all college athletes. All these, as well as other factors, may have conse-
quences advancing or retarding career and social mobility. One possible negative effect of college
athletic participation is on grades and, as a result, on career mobility. See id. at 258.
At least one commentator argues that those successful in athletic pursuits are innately successful
people:
[P]eople who succeed in sport and achieve upward mobility in or through sport are unusually
talented, intelligent, and persistent individuals, destined to succeed in whatever they do-
with or without the influence of their sports participation. A sports role has only given them
the chance to demonstrate their special capabilities.
H. NIXON I1, supra note 9, at 44-45. Similarly exorbitant claims have occurred at the opposite end
of the analytical spectrum. Perhaps none is more innocent of the realities of causation than the
following statement by a former university president: "In 1885 our first Gymnasium . . . was
erected by aid of the alumni . . . and a great impetus was given to athletics, which proved of
signal benefit to the health of the students. Before this four cases of insanity from overstudy
developed, but there were none afterwards." 2 K. BATTLE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA 513 (1912).
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cluding phrase."
Judicial construction of this language has led to widely divergent
conclusions regarding Title IX's applicability to similar factual circum-
stances. These interpretations of Title IX's triggering language fall into
three general categories. This Note identifies and analyzes these three
theories of Title IX's applicability and discusses their ramifications for
the cause of equal educational opportunity regardless of sex.
This Note concludes that Title IX's language deserves a common
sense interpretation 2 as a matter of jurisprudential policy' 3 and in ac-
cordance with the intent evidenced by Congress.' 4 In other words, of
the three extant judicial interpretations of Title IX's triggering lan-
guage, only one, the direct federal funding interpretation, is properly
deferential to the legislative process. By adopting this interpretation,
the legislative branch would retain or regain relative superiority over
the executive branch in matters of the lawmaking function."' Finally,
this Note argues that the plain language interpretation of Title IX's
triggering language using the direct funding theory may serve to re-
mind the Congress that it, and not the courts, is responsible not only for
creating, 16 but also for extending statutory law.' 7
If however, the Supreme Court were to identify the institution-as-
program interpretation as the correct reading of Title IX's triggering
language, effectuating its supposed anti-discriminatory policy,' 8 as op-
II. Title IX's jurisdiction-triggering-and limiting-language is the phrase "program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
12. See infra note 106.
13. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text; see infra notes 21-22, 24-25 and accompany-
ing text.
14. Evidence of congressional intent in enacting Title IX is largely in the statutory language
itself. See infra note 36. Accordingly, the statutory terms ought to be given their "ordinary mean-
ing." See infra note 97.
15. "The Anglo-American scheme of government conceives of lawgivers apart from and at
times paramount over courts." Landis, 4 Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886,
886 (1930). "The real problems arise where the meaning of the legislature is not discovera-
ble. . . . To condone in these instances the practice of talking in terms of the intent of the legisla-
ture, as if the legislature had attributed a particular meaning to certain words, when it is apparent
that the intent is that of the judge, is to condone atavistic practices too reminiscent of the medicine
man. No compromise can be had on this issue." Id. at 891. Accordid. at 892 (legislative and not
judicial intent must govern statutory interpretation). See also supra note 3-4 (the legislative func-
tion should be the province of the legislative branch of government).
16. U.S. CONST. art I, § I ("All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States. ... ); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("necessary and proper" clause).
17. See supra note 4.
18. From this jurisprudential viewpoint, statutory interpretation is the process of determining
a statute's underlying policy and not the process of historical reconstruction of judicial intent.
Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 423 (1942). Professor Radin, principal
advocate of this theory of statutory policy effectuation, argued that legislative intent is itself a
fiction: "A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some
two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of
the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and
4
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posed to its legislative contours,' 9 agency and executive branch powers
would ipso facto be enhanced with respect to those of the legislative
branch, to which the Constitution accords the lawmaking function.2"
Between these extremes of interpretation, the Court would have an
option tending to enhance the power of the judicial branch with respect
to both executive and legislative branches, roughly a common law
role. 2' Employing this self-perception, the Court would adopt the inge-
nious, if alchemic, judicial creation known as the indirect funding
interpretation.22
In short, lurking beneath the already complex issue of Title IX's ap-
plicability is the much larger issue of the allocation of legislative pow-
ers in American governance. This Note's thesis is based on the premise
that legislative power should continue to be given to the people's repre-
sentatives and not to undemocratic bodies,23 precisely as the Constitu-
beliefs." Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). Cf. infra note 36
(vagueness in statutory terms and legislative history is a concomitant of the legislative process).
The process of ascertaining and effectuating a statute's policy is, in effect, a means of substituting
compatible present purposes for the superseded intentions of a past legislature. In Professor Ra-
din's words, "[i]f the doctrine [of effectuating the policy behind legislation] means anything, it
means that, once the expression is before the court, the intent becomes irrelevant." Id. at 872. A
later commentator spoke of effectuating the "equity" or "spirit" of statutes: "[Tihe spirit of a
statute which differs from . . . a literal meaning may be taken if it is actually a sensible contextual
meaning that the words will bear by fair use of language." de Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of
Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. 538, 544 (1934).
19. A statute's legislative contours include not only the statute's language, but also its legisla-
tive history-what the enacting legislature meant at the time of passage if it can be determined.
The combination, then, becomes the statute's interpretation. "[T]he emphasis must lie upon the
honest effort of courts to give effect to the legislature's aims, even though their perception be
perforce through a glass darkly." Landis, supra note 15, at 893. The difference between using
legislative intent to ascertain the meaning of statutory language and effectuating a non incompati-
ble policy is that "genuine interpretation concerns itself only with the clarification of language
while spurious interpretation attempts to . . .substitute for the legislative policy the policy of the
courts." Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119, 123 (1932).
20. See supra notes 3 & 16.
21. In other words, the court would take precisely the opposite approach of that urged in note
15, supra, tending to judicial activism.
22. See infra text accompanying note 59.
23. The approach to statutory interpretation advocated in this Note--to ascribe primary im-
portance to the meaning of the statutory language itself--is not mere literalism or formalism.
Neither is it, however, ever to grant legislative intention a position of greater deference than that
due the statutory language itself. Legislative history is thus used as a means of confirming or
rendering more precise the meaning conveyed by a statute's plain language. Of an abundance of
commentary, the following examples articulate this common-sensical approach to the interpreta-
tion of statutes. "For judicial construction to stick close to what the legislation says and not draw
prodigally upon unformulated purposes or directions makes for careful draftsmanship and for
legislative responsibility. . . . Judicial expansion of meaning beyond the limits indicated this
reprehensible because it encourages slipshodness in draftsmanship and irresponsibility in legisla-
tion. It also enlists too heavily the private social and economic views of judges." Frankfurter, 4
Symposium on Statutory Construction-Forward, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1950); "The writer
is unwilling to accept the extreme thesis that the indefiniteness of words is so great that judges are
practically free agents in determining the effect to be given to statutory enactments." Jones, Ex-
trinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REv. 737, 739 (1940); "[I]t should be remembered
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tion intends.24 For in the macrocosm of jurisprudence, as well as in the
microcosm of Title IX's interpretation, only a plain language reading-
the direct funding interpretation-preserves the essential earmarks of
representative democracy: that laws proceed from the electorate speak-
ing through their legislators.25
A. Historical Context
1. Statutory Background
Title IX's basic prohibition of sex discrimination in education is
modeled on the language of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26
Title IX states: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance .... ,,2' As is true of Title VI,
enforcement of Title IX is accomplished in two ways: federal adminis-
trative enforcement and private enforcement actions.28
that statutes are written and published so that individuals may govern their conduct in accordance
with the legislative command. In such circumstances it is not unreasonable to insist that the bur-
den of communication is on the legislature, and that if words having a usually accepted 'meaning'
are used, that 'meaning' should be applied no matter what the legislature may have intended."
Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 516-17 (1940); "[Olnce
[legislative intention] has been discovered, it should be relevant to the solution of the case only if
consistent with the 'meaning' which may reasonably be attached to the words used." 1d. at 521;
"[Tihe whole document is found to have a certain play in the joints when its words are translated
into things by parol evidence, as they have to be. . . . Thereupon we ask, not what this man
meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using
them in the circumstances in which they were used ... " Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpre-
tation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 417-18 (1899). See also infra notes 97 & 106 and accompanying text
(Supreme Court states that statutory terms of Title IX should be given their "ordinary meaning").
24. See supra note 16. Read in conjunction with the commentary contained in notes 3 and 4,
supra, it is clear that the concept of representative democracy was intended to be secured by the
constitutional situation of the legislative function in the legislative branch. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
25. Id.
26. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), states, "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance."
The Supreme Court noted the parallel nature of Title IX and Title VI in Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-99 (1979) ("The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would
be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been. ... )
But in the Supreme Court's most recent consideration of the relationship between Titles VI and
IX, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982), stated: "The focus on the history of Title VI ... is misplaced. It is Congress' intention in
1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Id. at 529. Justice Blackmun
continues, "although two statutes may be similar in language and objective, we must not fail to
give effect to the differences between them." Id. at 530.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
28. In the former, the Department of Education (formerly the Department of Health, Educa-
tion & Welfare) is empowered to terminate federal funding to a sex-discriminatory educational
entity. Id. at § 1682(1). Note that, while the Department of Education does, in fact, have this
power over most federal government grants to educational institutions or programs, its funding
6
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The Department of Health, Education & Welfare originally, and the
Department of Education more recently, promulgated regulations to
define the terms and effectuate the purposes of Title IX.29 These regula-
tions refer not only to "program[s] or activit[ies]," as does the statute,
but also to "institution[s]" and "recipient[s]," thereby extending Title
IX's limited scope.30 They also deal with specific elements of the edu-
termination power extends only to those education programs or activities funded under its aus-
pices. If, for example, the Department of Defense administered a grant to education, it, and not
the Department of Education, would have the right to devise regulations for effectuating Title IX
with respect to that grant. Id. at § 1982. Such funding termination must be limited to the "partic-
ular program, or part thereof," in which sex discrimination has been found. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1)
provides, in pertinent part, that termination of federal financial assistance "shall be limited to the
particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding [of Title IX
noncompliance] has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found." This provision has been referred to as
the "pinpoint termination provision" of Title IX. See, e.g., Kuhn, Title IX Employment andAth-
letics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 65 (1976). Cf. infra note 51 (cases using
the program-specific language of 20 U.S.C. § 1682 as evidence of the limited meaning of the
phrase "program or activity" in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
The Supreme Court allowed the second means of enforcing Title IX, a private cause of action,
in Cannon v. University of Cicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court held that it was not necessary
to show legislative intent to create a private cause of action to enforce Title IX. An explicit denial
of such a cause of action would, however, have been controlling. Id. at 694. In Cannon, the Court
recognized that a cease and desist order may often better protect a complainant's interests than
would terminating federal funding of the discriminatory entity. Id. at 704-05.
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1983) (formerly 45 C.F.R. § 86; recodified when the Department of
Health, Education & Welfare's functions were transfered to the newly created Department of
Education in 1980).
30. Compare, e.g., Title IX's applicability to "any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982), with the regulations' applicability
"to every recipient and to each education program or activity operated by such recipient which
receives or benefitsfrom Federal financial assistance." 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1983) (emphasis ad-
ded). Note first that in the regulations the subject of the "which receives" clause is ambiguous; it
could be either "program or activity" or "recipient." If the subject of the clause is "program or
activity," the program may trigger Title IX not only by receiving, but also by benefiting from
"Federal financial assistance." If "recipient" is the subject of the "which receives" clause, then an
institutional "recipient" need merely have benefited from federal financial assistance directed at
some other entity, not necessarily educational. Both interpretations are problematic in that they
seem to extrapolate from the plain language of Title IX, § 1681 (a), which does not refer to benefits
or beneficiaries. As one persistent critic of the Title IX regulations has stated, "There are several
problems with that 'or benefiting from,' but foremost is the fact that Congress did not say it. HEW
said it." 121 CONG. REC. 23845 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
In addition, a "recipient" is defined in 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1983) to include an entity or person
"to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which
operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance ....
This definition of recipient would allow federal financial assistance directly to an institution to
become transformed into "benefits" in order to bring the institution's constituent programs or
activities within the reach of Title IX. No means of determining what constitutes a "benefit" is
established in the regulations; a benefit could, therefore, be hypothetical or inferred. Moreover,
such a benefit might no longer be either federal or financial in nature. In such a case, allowing the
benefit to trigger Title IX's strictures would be an invalid extension of Title IX, § 1681(a). This
view is expressed in the following commentary on 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1983), the applicability
provision of the regulations: "[Bly the insertion of the phrase 'or benefiting from' in connection
with Federal financial assistance, HEW brings within the coverage of its regulations activities
which do not receive Federal financial assistance in any reasonable sense of the concept. Thus,
7
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cational context, for example, athletics and admissions departments,
which Title IX does not. These regulations take a very expansive view
of the programatic language of Title IX.3'
2. Equal Education Opportunity and Athletics
Athletic activities for students at any level of proficiency, particularly
competitive sports, have long been recognized as important compo-
nents of an educational institution's offerings.3 2  Colleges have, how-
ever, not provided the athletic opportunities to women which they have
for so long lavished upon male students.33 Conspicuous though this
discrimination has been, women have had no legal means of obtaining
access to collegiate athletic programs: the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause does not recognize sex, unlike race, as an inher-
ently suspect classification. 34 Thus, provision of equal educational op-
portunities for women, traditionally denied, is best compelled, if at all,
through Title IX. But whether Title IX is expansive enough to compel
equal treatment in all college athletic departments if far from clear.35
the Department has made vague that which was precise .. " 121 CONG. REC. 23845 (1975)
(remarks of Sen. Helms). See also Koch, Title IX and the NCAA, 3 W. ST. U.L. REV. 250, 252
(1976) (Title IX's implementing regulations expand the statute's language by applying Title IX to
programs not directly receiving, but benefiting from another program's receipt of federal financial
assistance).
31. Id.
32. See Comment, supra note 9, at 876. Cf. supra note 10 (describing the educational impact
of sports participation).
33. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. v. Ohio State High School Ath-
letic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 passim (6th Cir. 1981) (benefits of athletic participation at all levels have
been limited for women); Edwards, supra note 9, at 188, 196 (women should demand access to
sports facilities, programs from which they have been historically excluded); Note, supra note 8, at
593 n.95 (HEW urged to deal "aggressively" to expand women's athletic opportunities in educa-
tional institutions). See generally supra note 9.
34. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). In Reed the Supreme Court set up a "middle tier"
of scrutiny for sex-based distinctions. This middle tier test is a heightened scrutiny form of "ra-
tional relation" test. The Court elaborated on middle-tier analysis under the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection clause in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). "[C]lassifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 197. Accord G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 964 (10th ed. 1980); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1063-66 (1978); Sassower, Women, Power, and The
Law, 62 A.B.A. J. 613 (1976).
35. See, e.g., University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v.
West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 79-80 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 698 F.2d
1215 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversal of order granting summary judgment; remanded to allow plaintiff to
argue direct federal funding does reach university's athletic department); remarks of Sen. Helms:
"The regulations are inconsistent with the enactment [Title IX] in that they apply to programs and
activities not receiving Federal funds such as athletics .. " 121 CONG. REC. 17300 (1975); re-
marks of Sen. Tower: "I do not believe that Congress intended Title IX to extend to intercollegi-
ate athletics .. " 120 CONG. REC. 15323 (1974); remarks of Sen. Bayh: "While the impact of
this amendment [Title IX] will be far reaching, it [Title IX] is not a panacea." 118 CONG. REC.
5808 (1972); "Even though there was an apparent absence of legislative intent, HEW has effec-
tively included collegiate sports within the purview of Title IX via the implementing regulations."
Koch, supra note 30, at 254; "The final implementing regulations are critically deficient from the
8
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Indeed, the language of Title IX almost certainly reflects the sort of
limiting compromise necessary to gain congressional enactment. 6
II. THREE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE IX's TRIGGERING
Each of the three extant judicial interpretations of Title IX's trigger-
ing language37 would have a markedly different impact on sex discrimi-
nation in college athletics. Moreover, the judicial prevalence of any
one interpretation would have much to say about congressional pri-
macy in the legislative function. 8
A. The Institution As "'Program or Activity"
If Congress's purpose in enacting Title IX 39 had been the complete
elimination of all forms of sex discrimination in education, Title IX's
triggering language4" would have been unnecessary.4' Congress would
standpoint that there is an absence of any recognition whatsoever for sports which generate reve-
nue." Id. at 258.
36. Compare Title IX, 20 .S.C. § 168 1(a) (1983) as enacted with the original Senate version
of Title IX:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program of activity con-
ducted by a public institution . . .which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance for any
education program or activity ....
117 CONG. REC. 30156 (1971) (emphasis added). The triggering language of the original Senate
bill was conspiciously institution-oriented; it covers public institutional "recipients." Title IX
would be triggered as to an allegedly discriminatory education program by the mere fact that the
public institution received federal financial assistance for "any education program or activity."
The plain language of Title IX § 1681(a) is, by contrast, program-oriented; it is the allegedly
discriminatory "program or activity" and not a "public institution" which must be "receiving,"
(present tense), "Federal financial assistance." Accord Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F.
Supp. 77, 78 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983).
That this change in phraseology between the original Senate version of Title IX and the enacted
version was not inconsequential is demonstrated by the language of Title IX's blindness provision,
20 U.S.C. § 1684, which retains the institutional triggering language: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of blindness or severely impaired vision, be denied admission in any
course of study by a recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education program or activ-
ity .. " (emphasis added). Section 1684, with its "recipient"/institutional language, is on its
face, of much broader potential applicability than is program-specific § 168 1(a).
37. Title IX's structures are triggered through the phrase, "program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1983).
38. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
39. Senator Bayh, a principal proponent of the Act, described Title IX as:
an important first step in the effort to provide for the women of America something that is
rightfully theirs-an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, to develop the skills
they want, and to apply those skills with the knowledge that they have a fair chance to secure
the jobs of their choice ...
118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972). See also Comment, Title IX's Promise ofEquality of Opportunity in
Athletics.- Does It Cover the Bases?, 64 Ky. L.J. 432, 432-34 (1975) (Title IX's purpose was to aid
in upgrading women's historic position of inferiority in American society).
40. "[E]ducation program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1982).
41. Title IX's otherwise absolute prohibition of sex discrimination in education is limited by
the Act's triggering language. See supra text accompanying notes 27 & 36.
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simply have coined an absolute prohibition. Assuming, arguendo, such
an absolute purpose in Title IX as passed, however, and the judicial
will to effectuate it, one would arrive at a construction of Title IX at the
opposite extreme from the direct funding interpretation this Note advo-
cates: validating the regulations in making the college or university
itself an "education program or activity"4 2 for purposes of triggering
Title IX.43 An institution of higher education which received some
form of university-wide "Federal financial assistance"" would subject
all its components to Title IX's strictures.45  In other words, there
would be no need to determine whether the university's athletic depart-
ment was a recipient of federal financial assistance since the university
itself is, under the institution-as-program model, both "program" and
"recipient" within the meaning of Title IX and its regulations.4 6
Precedent is lacking in the area of athletics in the institution-as-pro-
gram model, but the interpretation has been applied to an all-male col-
lege honorary society claiming exemption on the ground that it
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
43. 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 states that the regulations implementing Title IX apply "to every recip-
ient and to each educationprogram or activity .. " (emphasis added). Title IX itself is applica-
ble to "any education program or activity receiving .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). Because
recipients, as well as programs, are mentioned in the regulations, and since only programs are
covered by Title IX itself, it is necessarily true that the regulations are equating a recipient institu-
tion with an education program when interpreting Title IX's triggering language. Accord Iron
Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedler, 499 F. Supp. 496, 503 n.I (S.D. Fla. 1980), afd, 652 F.2d 445
(5th Cir. 1981).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
45. See, e.g., Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y. v. Hufstedler, 499 F. Supp. at 504-06 (A university
which receives federal financial assistance subjects organizations to which it provides "significant
assistance" to Title IX's strictures.) Iron Arrow Honor Society, the sex-discriminatory organiza-
tion in Iron Arrow, was an "outside" organization. Id. at 503. As a result, the nexus of "signifi-
cant assistance" between the university and the Society had to be established. Id. at 504-06.
Presumably, therefore, under the Iron Arrow court's reasoning, a university's internal organs
would automatically be subject to Title IX, assuming the university's receipt of some "Federal
financial assistance." Succinctly stated, "[i]f HEW's broad definition of 'receiving federal finan-
cial assistance' is sustained [i.e. the definition contained in the implementing regulations, 34
C.F.R. § 1061 . . . arguably every program of any educational institution enrolling students re-
ceiving federal aid or benefits will be subject to HEW regulation." Comment, HEW's Regulations
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
133, 168. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601 (D.S.C. 1974), aq'd, 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975) (Federal financial assistance provided directly to students at a university is "Fed-
eral financial assistance" to the university as a whole, thus subjecting the university's components
to Title VI's strictures). But see Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336,
338-39 (1st Cir. 1981) (rejecting institution-as-program interpretation, and following direct fund-
ing interpretation); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1386 n.12, a'd, 699 F.2d
309 (6th Cir. 1983) (questioning the continued validity of the institution-as-program reading of
Title IX adopted in Iron Arrow); Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 608, 609 (1980) (judicial interpretations and legislative history undermine HEW's institu-
tion-as-program interpretation of Title IX).
46. See supra note 43.
10
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received no earmarked federal funding.47 Applying this interpretation
to a college honorary society is quite different, however, from applying
it to a collegiate athletic department: no nexus of purpose between the
educational mission of the university and that of its athletic department
would, under the institution-as-program interpretation, be necessary.
Because a university's athletic department is an internal organ of the
institution,48 once a university receiving some form of federal financial
assistance is found to be a "program or activity" 49 within the meaning
of Title IX, Title IX is automatically triggered against the university's
athletic department.5"
This method of determining Title IX's breadth is attractive for its
administrative simplicity, but several courts have held that the regula-
tions implementing Title IX are impermissible extensions of statutory
authority, as they pertain to institutional recipients of federal financial
aid regardless of whether the institutional sub-unit allegedly in viola-
tion of Title IX actually receives any federal funds.5' These courts
have used as evidence of the Act's limited reach Title IX's enforcement
provision," which requires that the federal funds termination be lim-
ited to the discriminatory sub-unit.
53
Thus, courts are faced with a choice between the plain language of
Title IX, which entails the direct funding interpretation, and that of its
47. In Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedler, 499 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1980), a fid, 652
F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that the University of Miami was an education
program. 652 F.2d 445, aff'g 499 F. Supp. at 503 n. 1. Because it had determined that the honor-
ary society was an "outside" organization, however, the court had to find a commonality of pur-
pose between the university and the society in order to hold that the society's membership could
be regulated through Title IX's applicability to the university. 652 F.2d at 447.
48. For example, since the university itself is, under the institutional program model, an "ed-
ucation program" within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), its departments and related divi-
sions are elements of an "education program." But cf. infra note 73 (an athletic department which
is an "auxillary enterprise" for accounting purposes is not a part of the university's educational
provision).
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
50. Title IX is triggered as to an "education program." All the sub-divisions of the "educa-
tion program" are, therefore, subject to Title IX. See supra note 45.
51. See, e.g., University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v.
West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 698 F.2d 1215
(5th Cir. 1983); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (E.D. Mich. 1981), afj'd,
699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 736-38 (5th
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub noma. Bell v. Dougherty Co. School Sys., 102 S. Ct. 2264
(1982). Cf. Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the institution-as-program interpretation and espousing the direct funding interpreta-
tion, without reference to Title IX's implementing regulations).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
53. Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and re-
manded, 598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382
(E.D. Mich. 1981), affd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983); Dougherty Co. School Sys. v. Harris, 622
F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1980); Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 339
n.l (1st Cir. 1981).
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regulations, which interpret Title IX's triggering language according to
the institution-as-program theory. Recognition that Title IX's regula-
tions exceed the scope of the statute itself must lead to their invalida-
tion to the extent of that excess. Administrative regulations are
subordinate to the statute they purport to effectuate 4.5  No more than a
cursory reading of Title IX is necessary to convince one that the institu-
tion-as-program interpretation is not only disingenuous, but also an ar-
rogation by the executive branch (through the HEW/Education
Department's regulations) and by the judicial branch (to the extent that
courts apply the regulations where they so clearly and so critically
hyperextend the statute)" of exclusively legislative prerogatives. 6 In a
representative democracy, upholding such deficient regulations is
unacceptable. 7
B. The Indirect Funding Interpretation
Those who discard the institution-as-program approach as too bra-
zenly hyperextensive of legislative intent, but wish Title IX were a com-
prehensive prohibition, have espoused the indirect funding
interpretation of Title IX's triggering language, mistakenly assuming
that all athletic departments would thereby come within the scope of
Title IX's prohibitions. 8 The indirect funding interpretation would
classify a collegiate athletic department, as opposed to the institution as
a whole, as a "program or activity."59 The indirect approach, in addi-
tion, gives virtually unlimited breadth of the phrase "receiving Federal
financial assistance."6 Succinctly stated, the theory holds that federal
grants to an educational institution as a whole trickle-down into the
54. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes agencies [defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)
(1982) to include the Department of Education] to "publish in the Federal Register for the gui-
dance of the public . . . substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law. ... 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(D) (1982) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has on several
occasions upheld the rule of subordination of regulations to the statute they purport to effectuate:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and prescribe
rules and regulations to that end is . . . [only] the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this,
but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity.
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Accord Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); United
States v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977).
55. See supra note 43.
56. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 63 & 72.
59. In this, the indirect and direct federal funding interpretations are consistent. See Haffer
v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'dper curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1982). See also Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1077-78 (5th Cir. 1969) (estab-
lishing indirect federal funding to make Title VI applicable to local schools' education programs
or activities).
60. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981), a#dper curiam, 688
12
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university's constituent divisions, making those programs recipients of
"Federal financial assistance," thus subject to the strictures of Title VI
or Title IX.6'
Two components of the indirect funding theory emerge. First, each
institution is composed of any number of "program[s] or activit[ies];"
the institution itself is not a program to trigger Title IX with respect to
its constituent entities. Second, a program's receipt of assistance which
is both federal and financial in nature must be logically possible as well
as actually having occurred. Proponents of the indirect funding inter-
pretation have nevertheless seemed to equate the theoretical possibility
of a receipt with its actuality. They have thereby created an interpre-
tive problem, only to ignore its existence.
Perhaps this underscores the fundamental problem with the indirect
funding interpretation; it is a judicial creation which did not arise from
the interplay of legislative ingredients.62 The result is that the indirect
funding interpretation is unequal to the task for which it was created; it
simply does not clarify the extent of Title IX's applicability.63 In addi-
F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). Accord Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir.
1969).
61. See infra notes 63 & 73.
62. On the desirability of adhering to the principles of representative democracy by enacting
laws in legislatures, rather than allowing courts to make law, see generally supra notes 3-5, 21-22,
24-25 and accompanying text.
63. It is not, in short, logically sufficient to assert that because federal funds have been re-
ceived by an educational institution, the institution's constituent departments have received any
portion of the funding, even by way of in-kind benefits. For even if one allows, arguendo, that all
federal funding generates benefits to the institution as a whole, one has not established receipt of
"Federal financial assistance" by any of the institution's constituent "program[s] or activit[ies]."
Put another way, it is undeniable that federal funds provide many forms of benefits to the univer-
sity recipient. Even allowing that such benefits are, in fact, forms of "Federal financial assist-
ance," one will not have triggered Title IX; the statute's plain language requires that
discriminatory programs or activities actually receive such assistance. Therefore it is never certain
whether, under the indirect funding interpretation, Title IX is applicable.
One is left, therefore, with a problem falling within the province of accountants. Funding has
come to the institution from the federal government and has generated a variety of benefits. The
question is whether a specific department has received some portion of those federally generated
benefits. Resolution of the problem turns on the benefit's valuation, for Title IX explicitly states
that federal assistance sufficient to trigger Title IX must be "financial." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1982); "Federalfinancial assistance," 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1, .2(g) (1983) (emphasis added).
One may not conveniently ignore Congress' use of the adjective "financial" in Title IX's trigger-
ing phrase. It means that, whatever else can be said of the federal assistance, it must be financial.
"Financial," an adjective, is defined as, "I. pertaining to monetary receipts and expenditures;
pertaining or relating to money matters; pecuniary .. " RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 532 (1966). An item described as "financial" is, accordingly, always describ-
able as an objective amount of money. In the United States, financial assistance must be describa-
ble as some number of dollars worth of assistance; "financial assistance" under Title IX is no
exception. That a person or entity has ascertainably derived a certain benefit, does not assure that
the benefit was either federal in origin or financial in nature. Yet, both characteristics of the
assistance must be clearly present before Title IX is triggered against the entity in question. Note,
too, that the beneficiary and the recipient of federal financial assistance are two different "per-
sons." See Note, supra note 45, at 615. Title IX is applicable to an "educationprogram or activity
13
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tion, the indirect interpretation exaggerates the power of courts with
respect to legislatures, a jurisprudential reason for its abandonment.'
Furthermore, the indirect interpretation would serve to exempt "big
time" athletic departments from Title IX's strictures.65
receiving Federal financial assistance," not to a benefciary of federal financial assistance. 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (emphasis added). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601
n. 15 (D.S.C. 1974), arf'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (distinguishing recipients from beneficiaries
of "Federal financial assistance" in order to determine the applicability of Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Accordingly, to show a federally conferred benefit to a program as defined in the indirect fund-
ing approach, one must be able to describe the benefits in terms of a dollar amount, objectively
determined. This is referred to as the "money measurement principle" of accounting. The princi-
ple requires that all assets be measured in monetary terms. P. BERNEY, W. LYONS & S. GARSTKA,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 99-100 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BERNEY, LYONS &
GARSTKA].
A related principle--the "cost principle"-requires that assets be valued at original cost. Thus,
prospective gains and future value cannot be computed into the monetary value of an asset-
federal assistance. Id. at 100-01.
Valuation of financial assistance or benefits allegedly received indirectly from the federal gov-
ernment must be individualized, as the pro rated benefit will vary from person to person, depend-
ing on what characteristics an individual possesses. See supra note 10. Cf. G. CALABRESi, THE
COST OF ACCIDENTS 216 (1970) (individualization of pain and suffering in accidents). Individual-
izing the valuation of pain and suffering is analogous to individualizing valuation of personal
benefits for the purpose of triggering Title IX:
Actually, we cannot be fully satisfied with any way of valuing physical injuries because such
injuries involve elements not fully convertible into money; thus any device which converts
them into money will not be fully adequate. And yet in practice we do say that at some point
• . . we do make a decisionfor accidents which implies that the injuries are not priceless.
This means that some valuation of their cost is inevitable. Id. at 213.
But such benefits as prestige and social acceptance are less susceptible to measurement than tangi-
ble and visible physical injuries. Thus, the valuation of a benefit, for purposes of showing that it is
a form of "Federal financial assistance" under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982), and therefore that it
should trigger Title IX's strictures pursuant to the indirect funding theory, is further complicated.
The amount of financial loss which would be sustained by the program if the alleged federal
benefit were withdrawn has, furthermore, been held an insufficient measure of the dollar value of
the benefit. Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedler, 499 F. Supp. 496, 505 (S.D. Fla. 1980), af'd
652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981). Accounting principles would, therefore, be the only objective means
of determining whether the program actually received any federal financial assistance.
64. "Because so many of us like so much of what we have received at the hands of the judges,
as if they were so many philosopher-kings, the risk is that we will trade away the force of the
ballot .. " Breitel, supra note 3, at 771. Judicial incursion into the legislative realm are danger-
ously against public policy in that courts "have no taproot in the political system from which to
draw strength directly from the people. This lack may bode no good." Id. at 763. Breitel contin-
ues, "[tihe power of the courts is great indeed, but it is not a power to be confused with evangelic
illusions of legislative or political primacy." Id. at 777. See generally supra notes 3-5, 21-22, 24-25
and accompanying text (representative democracy entails restraint by the judiciary when faced
with interpretation of a legislative enactment).
65. In the context of collegiate athletics, conventional income statement accounting is the
only objective way to determine whether federal financial assistance actually has reached the ath-
letic "program or activity" in question. Title IX is applicable to educational programs "receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). Evaluation of the type of transaction
described by Title IX's triggering language lies uniquely within an accountant's field of expertise.
No adequate alternative means of financial valuation and transactional analysis exists. Such ac-
counting for receipts of financial value by the athletic department, from the federal government,
but through the medium of the university, would have to include payments and financially quanti-
fiable benefits to the university by the athletic department. This is required by the "matching
14
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Judicial use of indirect federal funding to apply Title IX to athletic
principle" of accounting: expenses must be subtracted from total revenue to determine net income
(profit) for the period in question. BERNEY, LYONS, & GARSTKA, supra note 63, at 104. An
entity's net income for a given period is revealed on the entity's "statement of income" by use of
the matching principle. Id. at 11. In other words, the athletic department's statement of income
would reflect its balance of payments relationship with is parent university. The athletic depart-
ment's record of operations, or statement of income, must reflect its financial relationship to all
other persons and entities for the period in question. The athletic department's statement of in-
come, (whether a positive or negative amount), must be kept separate from the university's overall
record of operations. This is a requirement of the "entity principle," which mandates separation
of an entity from its owners, suppliers, and other business relationships for accounting purposes.
Id. at 98. Cf. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY BUSINESS ADMIN-
ISTRATION 128, 129 (G. Van Dyke ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCA-
TION]. (An auxiliary enterprise, as well as an organized activity related to an educational
department, "should have its own budget and accounting to identify all operating costs and reve-
nues.") This principle is of particular importance when the athletic department is an "auxiliary
enterprise," as in the case of a big time athletic department. Id. at 202 (if athletic department is an
auxiliary entity, its accounting should be separate from the institution's); J. RUSSELL, THE FI-
NANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 321 (2d ed. 1954) ("The most important principle is to provide for
strict separation of the accounts for [auxillary] enterprises from those having to do with the educa-
tional programs"); AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, supra, at 167 (if athletic department is
separately incorporated, its financial report should be appended to the college or university's fi-
nancial report). Gross revenues of auxiliary enterprises are reported under an "other sources"
category on the university's financial statement. Id. at 193-94. If the athletic department is sepa-
rately incorporated, its transactions are not reported in the institution's financial statements, but
are appended. Id. Compare id. at 253 (example of university "Schedule of Current Funds Ex-
penditures," "Auxiliary Enterprises" category) with id. at 262 (example of "Schedule of Revenues
and Expenditures . . .Intercollegiate Athletics"). Note that the athletic department's report does
not indicate any receipts from the federal government; the university's report, on the other hand,
has a separate category for such receipts. This indicates either that the university does not know
how much of its federal funding has filtered into the athletic department (via federal student loan
recipients, etc.), or that the university does not consider any federal money at all to have reached
the athletic department. Clearly, though, the sample athletic department does not believe it re-
ceived any federal financial assistance during the period in question. Id. at 253, 262.
The seeming arbitrariness of accounting practices is particularly evident when applying them in
the university context. A university is an organic, social-science phenomenon which, unlike a
conventional business, markets a largely intangible product-education. Because the applicability
of Title IX depends on a program's receipt of "Federal financial assistance," 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a),
the internal logic of the indirect funding interpretation entails the use of accounting principles.
This can have the effect of drawing boundaries within the university where, as a functional matter,
none previously existed. While for accountants this presents no particular problem, the financial
separation of entities may perpetuate their actual separation, potentially eroding the vital symbio-
sis of functions within a university.
Balance sheet accounting has significant implications on the efficacy of the indirect funding
interpretation in triggering Title IX against an athletic department. Forms of financial assistance
coming to the athletic department indirectly from the federal government would comprise some
portion of the funding and financially quantifiable benefits coming to the department from the
university's general budget; the federal financial assistance is "buried." Federal financial assist-
ance is, if present at all, just one conceptual component of the funding "package" coming into the
athletic department from the university's general budget. A related question arises: At what point
does financial assistance cease to be federal, and begin to be university-originated? Arguably,
money budgeted by the university for its constituent programs cannot be anything but university
funding. The university has the power to allocate-budget-from its general funds; the program
receives funding from the university. Id. Thus, from the standpoint of both the university and its
athletic department, the financial transactions between them do not involve federal funds at all.
If, therefore, the financial benefits received by the athletic department from the university are
valued at less than the value of financial benefits generated by the athletic department for the
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programs of colleges is novel,6 6 but finds its precedent in several cases
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.61 In these Title
VI cases, federal funding of university-wide impact was used as a
means of obtaining jurisdiction over both the university and its constit-
uent parts.68  Title VI case law, in other words, recognizes the indirect
funding approach-that an institutional recipient of federal funds can
serve as the conduit by which federal funds are transmitted to any of
the institution's constituent programs, thereby subjecting those pro-
grams to the statutory strictures.69
Utility of the Title VI analogy is hindered by the fact that none of the
Title VI indirect funding cases dealt with race discrimination in a col-
legiate athletic program.7" This analogical limitation creates a signifi-
cant precedential vacuum, because a collegiate athletic department-
and particularly a "big time" athletic department-is uniquely in-
dependent.7 Still, analogous use of the indirect funding approach to
trigger Title IX would bring most, but not all, athletic departments
within Title IX's ambit.72 Those beyond Title IX's reach even under
the indirect funding interpretation are the "big time" athletic
departments.73
university as a whole, it is impossible, that any federal financial assistance actually reached the
athletic department during the fiscal year, accounting's standard unit of measurement. 1d.
"Big time" athletic departments would, by functional definition, have an automatic exemption
from Title IX's strictures under the indirect funding paradigm. Big time athletic departments are
those most likely, because of their financial characteristics (see infra note 73), to be generating
more money for the university than they receive from the university's general fund.
66. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 688 F.2d 14
(3d Cir. 1982) is the only case in which a court held Title IX applicable to a college athletic
department based on findings of indirect federal funding to the department. The indirect con-
struction of Title IX was rejected by the trial court in University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F.
Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) and in Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex.
1981), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983), which required direct federal funding of
an athletic department in order to bring the department within Title IX's ambit. 525 F. Supp. at
80-81. (Note that the remand of Bennett was merely to allow the plaintiffto argue that the univer-
sity's athletic department did, in fact, receive direct federal funding). Haffer, Richmond, and Ben-
nett are the only decisions which construe Title IX's triggering mechanism in the context of
intercollegiate athletics.
67. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); Flanagen v.
President & Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1976).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Despite its linguistic similarity to Title VI, Title IX is not a mere copy of Title VI. With
these two statutes in mind, Justice Blackmun stated, in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, "Al-
though two statutes may be similar in language and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the
differences between them." 456 U.S. at 530. Soon after the Supreme Court's North Haven opin-
ion, a court faced with the same question of the relationship between Titles VI and IX noted,
"Title IX lacks the constitutional scope of Title VI." University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp.
at 328. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
71. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75 & 77.
73. Because of the accounting implications of the indirect funding theory, it is necessary at
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Because these "big time" departments have an impact on the col-
this point to construct a meaningful definition of this class of "big time" athletic departments.
Such a definition was not germane to discussion of the institution-as-program interpretation, since
every organ of the university-recipient was, under that interpretation, covered by Title IX. In
employing the indirect interpretation, however, one shifts the programmatic locus at least to the
departmental level. The accounting implications of the indirect funding approach render a care-
ful definition of the departmental entities in question necessary. For purposes of this Note, none-
theless, one need only define a "big time" athletic department in order to discern clearly all organs
of a university which do not have "big time" characteristics.
To that end, a "big time" collegiate athletic department may be defined as a semi-autonomous,
income-producing organ of the university consisting chiefly, not but necessarily exclusively, of
"varsity" level athletic teams engaging in intercollegiate competition. In order to maintain its
fiscal profitability, pan of its definition, every "big time" athletic department must contain at least
one revenue-producing sport. See generally infra text accompanying notes 74-76. But cf. Jackson,
College Football Has Become a Losing Business, in SPORT, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 237, 238 (J.
Loy & G. Kenyon 1969) (Any institution which can afford to lose a lot of money on athletics "has
to be considered just as Big Time as a school that makes a lot of money"). The latter definition
ignores the obvious distinction between profitability of an athletic department and accumulated
institutional wealth on the one hand, and actual capital expenditures to cover athletic department
losses andpotential to make such capital expenditures on the other. In addition, no institution, no
matter how well endowed, could afford to cover massive athletic department losses indefinitely.
Thus, a department could, under Jackson's definition, remain big time for only a foreseeable and
finite period. Finally, definitions such as Jackson's do not correspond to the popular image of big
time athletic departments. Many of the departments which Jackson's definition would encompass
would have to comply with Title IX under the indirect federal funding interpretation of the stat-
ute. Big time athletic departments as defined in this Note, however, could not be forced to comply
with Title IX under the indirect funding interpretation. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
Part of the big time athletic department's profit must, moreover, be applied to the university's
general funds. Note that applying some portion of the athletic department-generated monies to
the university's general fund is an essential characteristic of the big time exemption posited here
under the indirect funding interpretation of Title IX's triggering mechanism, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
If the athletic department used all its revenues within the department, the exemption would not be
available, since university monies entering the department would not be exceeded by departmen-
tal revenues donated to the university as a whole.
The choice may not rest entirely with athletic department officials. The American Council on
Education manual states that "[i]nstitutional policy should determine the use of income resulting
from intercollegiate athletics." AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, supra note 65, at 134. A
collegiate athletic department may be classified as either an "auxiliary enterprise" or an "organ-
ized activity relating to an educational department" for purposes of describing its organizational
and financial relationship to the university as a whole.
"An auxiliary enterprise is an entity that exists to furnish a service to students, faculty, or staff,
and that charges at a rate directly related, but not necessarily equal, to the cost of the service. The
general public may be served incidentally by some auxiliary enterprises." Id. at 128. A big time
athletic department is likely to be an "auxiliary enterprise." An intercollegiate athletic program
which is a revenue-producing part of an academic department of physical education is an "organ-
ized activity related to an educational department":
An organized activity related to an educational department is an entity that exists to provide an
instructional or laboratory experience for students and that incidentally creates goods or serv-
ices that may be sold. In the course of providing the incidental goods or services, expendi-
tures are incurred in addition to those necessary solely for the educational benefit of the
students.
Id. (emphasis added).
The classification of some activities among the . . . categories may vary from institution to
institution, reflecting differences in the purposes for which they exist. For instance, at institu-
tions where gate receipts are sizeable, intercollegiate athletics should be classified as an auxil-
iary enterprise; where gate receipts are negligible and the athletic program is primarily
intended for students participation rather than spectator entertainment, intercollegiate athlet-
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legiate athletic milieu more substantial than their number would at first
glance suggest, 4 eliminating sex discrimination in them is crucial to the
equalization of opportunity in collegiate athletics as a whole. 5 Yet, the
indirect funding interpretation is of no help in bringing "big time" ath-
letic departments within Title IX's reach. By channeling more money
back into the university's general budget than they received each fiscal
year, these "big time" departments will have received no federal finan-
cial assistance discernible by means of generally accepted accounting
ics may be classified as an organized activity; where there are no gate receipts, it should be a
separately identified section of the budget for the department of physical education.
Id. at 129, 134.
As an "auxiliary enterprise," the big time athletic department is not, for financial purposes, a
part of the university's curricular provision. "In some cases ...the program of intercollegiate
athletics is operated purely as a business activity and consequently should not be classified with
the educational division of the institution." J. RUSSELL, supra note 65 at 178. A common charac-
teristic of auxiliary activities is the expectation that the income they produce will meet all expendi-
tures occasioned by their operation. In this respect the auxiliary activities contrast with the
educational program, which is normally expected to have some subsidy from tax appropriations,
endowment, or other sources. Id. at 319.
Consequently, a semantic program arises. The big time athletic department is, under two of the
three interpretations of Title IX's triggering language, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), an "education program
or activity." See infra note 115 (direct funding interpretation); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F.
Supp. 531, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'dper curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) (indirect funding
interpretation). But see supra text accompanying notes 42-43 & 45-46 (institution-as-program in-
terpretation). But under the applicable accounting classifications, the big time athletic department
is an "auxiliary enterprise," not a party of the university's "educational program." J. RUSSELL,
supra note 65, at 319. The problem is mainly paradoxical. Russell used the term "educational
program" to refer to an institution's entire curricular provision; he distinguishes a functionally
independent athletic department as not a part of the teaching curriculum. Title IX, § 1681(a)
employs the phrase "education program or activity," and under two of its three extant interpreta-
tions is understood to refer to an institutional subdivision, educational in the broadest sense.
The separation of the athletic department from its parent university is not a new phenomenon:
college sports are now in their second big time cycle. Athletic associations, which appeared in the
early twentieth century to finance and manage college sports-especially football-were, "in effect
private corporations. University administrations exercised little more than nominal control over
them." Jackson, supra, at 237. After the post-World War 1I influx of veterans, a decline in specta-
tor revenues forced the athletic associations to turn to the university's general budget for financial
support. A decline in athletic association/department autonomy occurred concomitantly. Id. at
238. Increased media attention to major college sports programs has again made many athletic
departments-the big time departments-functionally independent of central university control.
As a result, one sociologist has argued that, "businessmen-those individuals whose decisions
influence the dispersion of opportunities for achievement-dominate and control most of our col-
legiate athletics." Edwards, supra note 9, at 189. The number of departments so influenced--Le.,
privately sustained-would not seem to justify Edwards' statement. Note, however, that those
departments to which his statement is applicable have a disproportionately large impact on the
intercollegiate athletic milieu. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
74. The big time departments are without question the most "visible" college athletic depart-
ments and set the tone for collegiate athletics as a whole. The importance of the indirect funding
implicit exemption for big time departments is not that it would lead to wholesale abandonment
of Title IX's purposes. Rather, the danger lies in allowing exempted athletic departments to com-
ply when it is convenient-to discriminate selectively.
75. See supra note 10.
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principles. 6 A conservative estimate of the number of athletic pro-
grams which might annually find themselves with a net outlay to the
university as a whole has been estimated to be twenty-eight percent of
all revenue-producing athletic programs.77 Thus, any extension of Ti-
tle IX's coverage in the athletic context through use of the indirect
funding interpretation is ultimately a pyrrhic victory. The most nota-
ble offenders will remain unfettered, and make it hard for small time
athletic programs (which are fettered) to compete.
The conclusion is inescapable. "Big time" athletics do not come
within Title IX's circumscription, even using the indirect funding inter-
pretation. Consequently, installing indirect funding as the normative
interpretation of Title IX's triggering language would not only divorce
the statute's meaning from its language, but would also circumvent the
reality of legislative compromise7 8-with no effect whatsoever on the
most influential athletic departments, the "big time" departments.79
Title IX apologists may, initially, be reluctant to abandon the indi-
rect funding interpretation. However, their reluctance should disap-
pear when faced with the prospect of other organs of colleges and
universities coming to share the financial characteristics of "big time"
athletics8" (and thus becoming exempt from Title IX). One who real-
izes the unexplored implications of the indirect funding interpretation
cannot escape the conclusion that the indirect funding interpretation
does not suffice to circumvent the limiting language in which Title IX is
couched. "Big time" athletics are not merely an exception to prove a
supposed rule (of the indirect funding interpretation's validity), but
76. See supra notes 63 & 65. On "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP), see
generally BERNEY, LYONS & GARSTKA, supra note 63, at 97-106.
77. Note, supra note 8, at 579 n.31.
78. See supra note 36.
79. See supra notes 65 & 73.
80. The class of exemptions which would arise under the indirect funding model is based on
university organization and program structure. The exemptions would tend, like big time athletic
departments, to be profitable quasi-corporations within the university. Other than big time ath-
letic departments, no such exemptions presently exist under this model.
Most of the potential exemptions under the indirect funding approach are, unlike an athletic
department (not affiliated with a department of physical education), connected to an academic
department of the university. Members of these departments are frequently recipients of federal
research grants. The products of their research are made possible by the direct federal funding of
their research projects. Accordingly, if the university created, for example, a genetic engineering
corporation, it would almost inevitably have to comply with Title IX, since much of the research
which created the firm's product would have been federally funded. In such a case, the mere fact
that the corporation channeled its massive profits into the university's general funds would not
serve to exempt the corporation from Title IX under the indirect funding exemption here poisted.
Similarly, a university's professional drama company would probably be subject to Title IX on the
basis of direct federal subsidies. The applicability of Title IX would, as always under either the
direct or indirect federal funding interpretations, have to be determined on a program-by-program
basis within each institution's structure.
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rather a signal which reveals the theoretical vapidity and disingenuous-
ness of the indirect interpretation.
Only four courts have been squarely faced with determining the
meaning of the phrase "receiving Federal financial assistance" in the
athletic context.8" Only three of these cases concerned institutions of
higher education.
Haffer v. Temple University8" involved women students who alleged
sex discrimination in the university's athletic program.8 3  The trial
court adopted the indirect federal funding interpretation of section
1681(a), but in keeping with the methods used in the Title VI indirect
funding cases 4 did not use accounting principles to determine whether
Temple's Athletic Department received federal financial assistance. As
Haffer was the first case to interpret Title IX's triggering language ac-
cording to the indirect approach in the context of collegiate athletics, it
is not surprising that the court did not explore the administrative and
financial peculiarities which may, and generally do, make athletic de-
partments unique among the organs of a university.85 Had the court
fully explored the ramifications of applying the indirect funding inter-
pretation in the collegiate athletic context, it would have recognized
that all athletic department financial operations had to be examined in
order to determine whether the department actually received federal
financial assistance.86 Temple's has, however, conspicuously never
81. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v. West Texas
State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983);
Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afl'dper curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), al 'd, 699 F.2d 309
(6th Cir. 1983).
82. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'dper curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 532.
84. E.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); Flanagan v. Ge-
orgetown, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
85. See supra notes 63, 65, 73 & 80.
86. Realization of the unique position of many athletic departments within the university
structure (see supra note 73) and the need to ascertain whether those departments received "Fed-
eral financial assistance" under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) entails the use of accounting methods.
One such method is the matching principle. See generally BERNEY, LYONS & GARSTKA, supra
note 63, at 104.
It is slightly more likely that an athletic department would receive direct federal funding if the
department were a subdivision of a department of physical education comprising one of the ad-
ministrative divisions of the teaching curriculum. As one proceeds farther along the spectrum
from these departments towards the big time departments, it becomes less and less likely that the
athletic department in question is receiving direct federal grants or subsidies. This is primarily
because federal grants are designed to facilitate academic research, not to fund spectator sports.
If, moreover, college athletic departments did, in fact, commonly receive direct federal financial
assistance, interpretation of Title IX's triggering mechanism would be unnecessary. In University
of Richmond v. Bell, the Department of Education, in fact, argued that "athletic programs are
never earmarked for direct Federal funding and that [the Department of Education] may obtain
jurisdiction over an athletic department only if indirect funding is considered to be a basis for
jurisdiction." 543 F. Supp. 321, 332 n.17. Plaintiffs in both Bennett v. West Texas State Univ.,
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been a "big time" athletic department. The case's outcome would,
therefore, not have been different had the accounting principles here
advocated been applied.
For most athletic departments, like Temple's, the indirect interpreta-
tion would trigger Title IX. However, that fact alone should not con-
vince one that it is the best interpretation of Title IX's triggering
language. The adoption of that interpretation by the Supreme Court
would enshrine only a halfway measure. A minority of collegiate ath-
letic departments having hegemonic influence on the conduct of col-
legiate athletics are beyond Title IX's reach under the indirect funding
interpretation.87 This specific deficiency illustrates the fundamental
problem with departing from the concept of representative democracy
sufficiently to allow courts and executive branch agencies to become de
facto legislators. For whatever its shortcomings when measured
against the magnitude of the problem it seeks to solve, a legislative
enactment was once the political least common denominator of a legis-
lative majority.88 This, in itself, renders the indirect approach, a judi-
525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 198 1), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983) and Haffer v.
Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afJ'dper curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982), had
to resort to the indirect federal funding interpretation of Title IX's language precisely because they
recognized that there was no direct federal funding of those universities' athletic programs. Only
if the defendant institution were one of the United States military/"service" academies would
direct federal funding of a non-academic athletic department exist. In such a case, it would be
unnecessary to find additional means of rendering Title IX applicable.
87. The objection is not merely theoretical. Covering the majority of athletic departments
would obscure much of any perceived need for further legislation to end sex discrimination in
education, and particularly in athletics. Proponents of equality of educational opportunity re-
gardless of sex are, in other words, wiser to recognize the limited nature of Title IX and to adopt
an interpretation which maximizes the apparent need for further, complementary legislation, than
to adopt the indirect interpretation, inherently minimizing the need for further legislation.
An additional drawback to using the indirect federal funding model is the difficulty and admin-
istrative cost which both government and institutions might incur by implementing the accounting
principles necessary to determine whether a particular collegiate athletic department was "receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance," 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), during the particular fiscal year. Cf. supra
note 65 (describing financial relationships between universities and their athletic departments).
Although accounting practices currently in use are entirely adequate for the university's own pur-
poses, they are not cognizant of indirect financial receipts. See, e.g., AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION, supra note 65, at 253, 262.
Both university and athletic department account for their own receipts and expenditures. In-
cluded in the university's financial report is a "Governmental Appropriations" category, which
reports receipts from the government for "educational and general purposes." Id. at 191. The
athletic department's financial report typically would not show governmental subsidies. See supra
note 73. Thus, the link between federal government subsidies to the university and the athletic
department, crucial to invoking Title IX under the indirect funding interpretation, is absent.
It is out of the discernment and valuation of indirect federal financial subsidies in any form to
the university's athletic department that the additional costs of implementing the indirect interpre-
tation arise. Incurring these administrative costs to install a means of triggering Title IX which
would serve to exempt twenty-eight percent of all revenue-producing programs (see supra note 77)
is far from rational. Such an inefficient mode of enforcement cannot have been the intent of
Congress in enacting Title IX. See supra note 36.
88. See supra notes 3 & 36.
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cial incursion into legislative branch territory,89 unacceptable when
compared with the direct approach to interpreting Title IX's triggering
language. 90
C. The Direct-Earmarked-Federal Funding
In marked contrast to the first two interpretations, the direct funding
interpretation of Title IX's triggering language is both honest and un-
ambiguous. Direct and indirect interpretations coincide in defining a
"program or activity" as a department or equivalent division of an edu-
cational institution. But there the similarity ends.
1. The Direct Funding Theory
The direct funding interpretation holds that Congress drafted Title
IX's triggering language in order to state clearly its intent that Title IX
apply only to those organs of the educational institution which actually
and directly receive federal funding. Because such a common sensical
interpretation may seem too simplistic to have proceeded from the
majoritarian mind of Congress, one need only reflect that if Congress
had intended to institute either the indirect funding interpretation or
the institution-as-program approach, then Title IX is an exceptionally
poorly drafted statute. Neither its plain language9' nor its legislative
history92 suggest either interpretation.
While the Supreme Court has not announced a definitive interpreta-
tion of Title IX's triggering language, the Court strongly hinted in
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell93 that it disapproved of the
institution-as-program approach. But because it chose not to define the
word "program" as used in Title IX,94 the Court has not yet dispatched
the institution-as-program interpretation to its deserved fate.95 Both
the majority and the dissenters96 in North Haven opined that the pri-
89. See supra note 16.
90. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
91. The phrase, "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1982).
92. See supra note 36.
93. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
94. 456 U.S. at 539 ("[W]e do not undertake to define 'program' in this opinion").
95. North Haven involved the fundamental question of whether employees of an education
program are "persons" within the meaning of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). See supra note
73 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, the Court's majority had little difficulty in determin-
ing that employees are, indeed, persons. 456 U.S. at 520 (Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority,
consisting of Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Stevens and White). But behind this simple
conclusion lie reasoning and determinations which render the North Haven opinion of great evi-
dentiary value in urging adoption of the direct funding interpretation of Title IX's triggering
language.
96. Justice Powell authored the dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined.
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mary guide in interpreting Title IX should be the plain language of the
statute itself.9 7 The Court's opinion went on to hold that Title IX is
applicable only to education programs, not to entire institutions.98
Having held that Title IX's scope is limited to "education programs,"
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, described Title IX as
prohibiting sex discrimination in "federally financed education pro-
grams"99 and in "federallyfunded education programs."'0° In support
of his construction of the statute's triggering language, Blackmun
quotes Title IX's principal sponsor, Senator Bayh, who used the words
"funds" and "funded" in describing the statutory term "financial assist-
ance" during floor debate on Title IX. 10 These interpretations of Title
IX's triggering phrase, "education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance,"'0 2  imply use of the direct funding
interpretation.
Finally, the Court held that while Title IX's language bears striking
similarity to that of Title VT,' 03 "we must not fail to give effect to the
differences between them." ° The Court thus indicated that Title VI
case law is not determinative in interpreting similar languag6 in Title
IX.
2. Caselaw: Direct Federal Funding And Collegiate Athletics
Though North Haven has no substantive kinship to those cases in-
volving Title IX's applicability in the collegiate athletic context, 0 5 it
97. Justice Blackmun stated that Title IX's terms should be construed according to their "or-
dinary meaning." "Our starting point in determining the scope of Title IX is, of course, the statu-
tory language." 456 U.S. at 520. Justice Powell, in his dissent, added, "[nior must a court shun
common sense in resolving ambiguities." Id. at 555 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 77
(1976)).
98. "Title IX's legislative history corroborates in general program-specificity. Congress
failed to adopt proposals that would have prohibited all discriminatory practices of an institution
that receives federal funds. . . . We conclude. . . that an agency's authority under Title IX both
to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific Limita-
tion. Id. at 537.
99. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 524. Senator Bayh stated: "[T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning
sex discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds." 118 CONG. REC. 5803
(1972). Bayh reiterated: "Central to my amendment [which became Title IX] are sections 1001-
1005, which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education pro-
grams. . . . Id. at 5807.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
104. 456 U.S. at 530 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978)).
105. North Haven dealt primarily with whether the word "person" as used in § 1681(a) in-
cludes employees of an "education program." The cases arising in the athletic context focus on
the construction of Title IX's triggering language, especially the word "program." The Court
explicitly declined to address this question in North Haven. 456 U.S. at 539.
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has substantial weight in corroborating what logic ° 6 had already
taught thoughtful judicial analysts. °7
The first case to examine Title IX's triggering language in the athletic
context was Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board.'° In Othen plaintiff
alleged her dismissal from her high school golf team occurred as a re-
sult of sex discrimination. The Othen court held Title IX inapplicable,
as the school's athletic program received no "Federal financial assist-
ance."' 0 9 The Othen court, moreover, held that the Department of Edu-
cation regulations purporting to implement Title IX in the athletic
context' 10 were invalid to the extent that they employed an institutional
view of Title IX's programmatic language.'''
Ground broken by the Othen court soon served as foundation for a
similar holding in the collegiate context. In Bennett v. West Texas State
University" 2 plaintiff alleged pervasive sex discrimination in the uni-
versity's athletic department, contrary to Title IX as effectuated by its
regulations. Like the Othen court, the Bennett court held Title IX ap-
plicable only to those constituent programs of the educational institu-
tion actulally receiving direct federal funding." 3 To the extent that
Title IX's regulations imposed a more expansive interpretation of Title
IX's triggering language, in contravention of the statute's plain mean-
ing, the Bennett court held the regulations invalid. "'
As rendered applicable in the context of collegiate athletics by the
Bennett court, the direct funding interpretation has several significant
implications in the college and university setting. First, a university
athletic department is a "program or activity" within the meaning of
Title IX. 5 Second, federal financial assistance must take the form of
106. In addition to the majority's admonition to give statutory terms their ordinary meaning,
id. at 521, Justice Powell restated in his dissent that where a statute's meaning is uncertain, a court
must "draw upon" 'those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining direction
without a compass.' " 1d. at 555 n.17 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976)). One can
scarcely imagine stronger endorsements for the use of logic in giving Title IX its plain-direct--
meaning.
107. Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded,
598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich.
1981), aff-d, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). The appeals courts' decisions are consistent, so far as
they go, with the Supreme Court's decision in North Haven.
108. 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), afl'd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983).
109. Id.
110. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1983).
111. 507 F. Supp. at 1387. Note that the Othen court's holding is entirely consistent with
North Haven's reaffirmation of Title IX's program-specificity. 456 U.S. at 539.
112. 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. 525 F. Supp. at 80. Accord Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F. 2d
663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Mich. 1981), aftd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983).
114. 525 F. Supp. at 80.
115. Id. at 77. Plaintiff and defendant were in agreement that the university's athletic depart-
ment constituted a "program" within the meaning of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
24
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purpose-earmarked funding." 6 Third, and most importantly, a "pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" is that program
to which the federal check is, in effect, made payable." 7
The most recent case interpreting Title IX's triggering language in
the context of collegiate athletics benefited not only by the awareness of
previous courts' conclusions in Othen,"I8 Bennett,' '9 and Haffer, 120 but
also by the Supreme Court's reasoning and ruling in North Haven. 21
As a result, the trial court's opinion in University of Richmond v. Bell 22
is exceptionally well-founded in adopting the direct funding interpreta-
tion of Title IX's triggering language.
In Richmond the university sought to enjoin the Department of Edu-
cation from investigating the athletic department pursuant to Title IX's
implementing regulations. The university argued that since its athletic
department received no direct federal funding, the Department of Edu-
cation lacked statutory authority to compel the athletic department's
compliance with Title IX. 23 To the extent that the regulations author-
ized the Department of Education's investigation, plaintiff argued they
were invalid extensions of Title IX's plain language.' 24
In rejecting defendant's institution-as-program view of Title IX's
coverage, 25 the Richmond court also refuted the indirect funding inter-
pretation. 126 Granting that some portion of some students' payment of
tuition and fees comes from federal sources, the court held that, "even
if such funds could be construed as aid to educational institutions,
127
they do not constitute direct aid to the intercollegiate athletic pro-
gram;" 28 thus Title IX did not apply. 129 Having followed the Supreme
Court's direction in North Haven to refer primarily to the statute's
116. Id. at 80. Note that the appeal court's reversal affirmed Title IX's program specificity.
598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983).
117. 525 F. Supp. at 80. Accord Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d
336, 339 n.2 (lst Cir. 1981) ("once admitted to an educational institution, allegations of discrimi-
nation in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 must involve discrimination by the particular funded edu-
cation program within that institution.") Cf. Koch, supra note 30, at 252 (Title IX applies only to
programs directly receiving federal financial assistance).
118. 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
119. 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
120. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
121. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
122. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
123. Id. at 323-25.
124. Id. at 325.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 332 n.17.
127. The court identified the funds in question as tuition and fees paid to the university by
students. The court characterized these fees as compensation to the university for services ren-
dered and not as aid, much less "Federal financial assistance" within the meaning of Title IX. Id.
at 330.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 327 n.10.
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plain language in interpreting Title IX, 130 the Richmond court suc-
cienctly stated the import of the direct funding interpretation in the
collegiate context: the Department of Education "should not in the fu-
ture endeavor to investigate, regulate, coerce, or intimidate colleges and
universities with regard to programs or activities that do not receive
direct federal financial assistance."'' Accordingly, finding no evi-
dence of any direct federal financial assistance to the university's ath-
letic department, the court granted plaintiff the injunction.
Significantly, in Richmond the Department of Education argued that
athletic programs never receive direct federal funding, and therefore
that an athletic department is covered only by the indirect interpreta-
tion. 132 To this negative argument against adoption of the direct inter-
pretation, the court responded by reasserting the legislative supremacy
of Congress. Since, in other words, in Title IX Congress created a law
which, in practical terms, exempts collegiate athletic departments, the
Department of Education is bound to preserve that exemption.
133
In so holding, the Richmond court focused on the real issue in inter-
preting Title IX's triggering language-the question of allocation of
legislative function in a democracy. One may concede that rudimen-
tary notions of justice require that women have the opportunity to par-
ticipate in collegiate athletic activities with all appropriate equipment
and support resources, yet maintain that only the direct funding inter-
pretation of Title IX's triggering language is appropriate. It is equally
basic that, in a democracy, upholding regulations which may vary with
the change of federal administrations, which are enacted unilaterally in
the executive branch, and which lack authorization in their enabling
statute 134 would frustrate the underlying principle of governance.1
35
Agencies, as well as courts, must respect the realities of legislative com-
promise 36 if the concept of representative democracy is to have any
130. See supra note 97.
131. 543 F. Supp. at 333.
132. Id. at 332 n.17.
133. Id. The Richmond court stated, in effect, that the Department of Education's own admis-
sion that collegiate athletic departments are not federally funded, if true, renders Title IX inappli-
cable to those departments.
134. On the principle that administrative regulations cannot exceed the scope of their enabling
statute, see supra note 54. Several courts have held that Title IX's regulations are impermissibly in
excess of the statute's scope. See Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336
(1st Cir. 1981); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v. West
Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir.
1983) (appeals court did not reverse trial court on this point); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507
F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), af7'd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983) (appeals court did not con-
sider the regulations). But see Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), a'dper
curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedler, 499 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.
Fla. 1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981).
135. See supra notes 3-5 & 15 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 36.
26





The "ordinary meaning" of Title IX's triggering language, as well as
an absence of evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, demands
that courts adopt the direct funding interpretation in applying Title
IX.'3 7 This interpretation is the only one of the three set forth in this
Note which accords proper deference to the congressional function in
lawmaking-that of serving as a forum for public opinion on matters of
public policy. 3 ' It is, furthermore, in the best tradition of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.' 39
Only the direct funding interpretation supplies a reading of Title
IX's triggering language which accords the legislative branch due def-
erence."4 The direct funding interpretation merely accepts what has
been obvious but too seldom recognized: Title IX does and will exempt
non-federally funded education programs-including collegiate ath-
letic departments-until such programs become recipients of federal
funds or until Title IX's triggering language is legislatively broadened.
STEPHEN W. DEVINE*
137. See supra notes 97 & 106.
138. See supra notes 3-5 & 15.
139. See supra notes 15, 19 & 23.
140. See supra notes 3-5 & 15 and accompanying text.
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